[sandbox] Landlock support

* Support disabling Landlock at compile time or runtime if unsupported,
  without disabling seccomp
* Support older Landlock ABI versions
* Support an extra arbitrary RW path, inteded for the coredump dir
* Support database locations other than the working directory
This commit is contained in:
2024-09-28 14:14:49 +02:00
parent 68b56e7c25
commit 197ccad0eb
6 changed files with 180 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
#include "settings.hpp"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <filesystem>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
@@ -17,6 +20,10 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/net.h> // for socketcall() args
#ifndef CONFIG_NOLANDLOCK
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#endif
/*
* Macros adapted from https://outflux.net/teach-seccomp/
* Relevant license:
@@ -297,25 +304,178 @@ static sock_fprog prog = {
ARRLEN(filter), filter
};
// our own wrapper for the seccomp() syscall
// Our own wrapper for the seccomp() syscall.
int seccomp(unsigned int operation, unsigned int flags, void *args) {
return syscall(__NR_seccomp, operation, flags, args);
}
void sandbox_start() {
#ifndef CONFIG_NOLANDLOCK
// Support compilation on systems that only have older Landlock headers.
#ifndef LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER 0
#endif
#ifndef LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE 0
#endif
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
};
uint64_t landlock_perms = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG
| LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
int landlock_fd;
bool landlock_supported;
/*
* Our own wrappers for Landlock syscalls.
*/
int landlock_create_ruleset(const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *attr, size_t size, uint32_t flags) {
return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags);
}
int landlock_add_rule(int ruleset_fd, enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, const void *rule_attr, uint32_t flags) {
return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, rule_attr, flags);
}
int landlock_restrict_self(int ruleset_fd, uint32_t flags) {
return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags);
}
static void landlock_path(std::string path, uint32_t perms) {
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {
.allowed_access = perms
};
path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path.c_str(), O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC);
if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) {
perror(path.c_str());
exit(1);
}
if (landlock_add_rule(landlock_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, &path_beneath, 0)) {
perror("landlock_add_rule");
exit(1);
}
close(path_beneath.parent_fd);
}
static bool landlock_detect() {
int abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
if (abi < 0) {
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EOPNOTSUPP) {
std::cout << "[WARN] No Landlock support on this system" << std::endl;
return false;
}
perror("landlock_create_ruleset");
exit(1);
}
std::cout << "[INFO] Detected Landlock ABI version: " << abi << std::endl;
switch (abi) {
case 1:
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
landlock_perms &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER;
// fallthrough
case 2:
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
landlock_perms &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
}
return true;
}
static void landlock_init() {
std::cout << "[INFO] Setting up Landlock sandbox..." << std::endl;
landlock_supported = landlock_detect();
if (!landlock_supported)
return;
landlock_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
if (landlock_fd < 0) {
perror("landlock_create_ruleset");
exit(1);
}
std::string dbdir = std::filesystem::path(settings::DBPATH).parent_path();
// for the DB files (we can't rely on them being in the working directory)
landlock_path(dbdir == "" ? "." : dbdir, landlock_perms);
// for writing the gruntwork file
landlock_path(settings::TDATADIR, landlock_perms);
// for passowrd salting during account creation
landlock_path("/dev/urandom", LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE);
// for core dumps, optionally
if (settings::SANDBOXEXTRAPATH != "")
landlock_path(settings::SANDBOXEXTRAPATH, landlock_perms);
}
#endif // !CONFIG_NOLANDLOCK
void sandbox_init() {
if (!settings::SANDBOX) {
std::cout << "[WARN] Running without a sandbox" << std::endl;
return;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_NOLANDLOCK
landlock_init();
#else
std::cout << "[WARN] Built without Landlock" << std::endl;
#endif
}
void sandbox_start() {
if (!settings::SANDBOX)
return;
std::cout << "[INFO] Starting seccomp-bpf sandbox..." << std::endl;
// Sandboxing starts in sandbox_thread_start().
}
void sandbox_thread_start() {
if (!settings::SANDBOX)
return;
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
perror("prctl");
exit(1);
}
if (seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, &prog) < 0) {
#ifndef CONFIG_NOLANDLOCK
if (landlock_supported) {
if (landlock_restrict_self(landlock_fd, 0)) {
perror("landlock_restrict_self");
exit(1);
}
}
#endif
if (seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog) < 0) {
perror("seccomp");
exit(1);
}