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Laika/lib/src/lpeer.c
CPunch 8438378560 Major refactoring
lots and lots of changes. too many to list tbh, might rebase this commit later if i get bored enough.
2022-02-28 16:27:55 -06:00

253 lines
9.1 KiB
C

#include "lerror.h"
#include "lmem.h"
#include "lpeer.h"
struct sLaika_peer *laikaS_newPeer(struct sLaika_peerPacketInfo *pktTbl, struct sLaika_pollList *pList, void *uData) {
struct sLaika_peer *peer = laikaM_malloc(sizeof(struct sLaika_peer));
laikaS_initSocket(&peer->sock);
peer->packetTbl = pktTbl;
peer->pList = pList;
peer->uData = uData;
peer->pktSize = 0;
peer->type = PEER_UNVERIFIED;
peer->pktID = LAIKAPKT_MAXNONE;
peer->setPollOut = false;
peer->outStart = -1;
peer->inStart = -1;
peer->useSecure = false;
memset(peer->hostname, 0, LAIKA_HOSTNAME_LEN);
memset(peer->ipv4, 0, LAIKA_IPV4_LEN);
return peer;
}
void laikaS_freePeer(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
laikaS_cleanSocket(&peer->sock);
laikaM_free(peer);
}
void laikaS_emptyOutPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer, LAIKAPKT_ID id) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
laikaS_writeByte(sock, id);
/* add to pollList's out queue */
laikaP_pushOutQueue(peer->pList, peer);
}
void laikaS_startOutPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer, LAIKAPKT_ID id) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
if (peer->outStart != -1) /* sanity check */
LAIKA_ERROR("unended OUT packet!\n");
laikaS_writeByte(sock, id);
peer->outStart = sock->outCount;
if (peer->useSecure) { /* if we're encrypting this packet, append the nonce right after the packet ID */
uint8_t nonce[crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
randombytes_buf(nonce, crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
laikaS_write(sock, nonce, crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
}
}
int laikaS_endOutPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
uint8_t *body;
size_t sz;
if (peer->useSecure) {
/* make sure we have enough space */
laikaM_growarray(uint8_t, sock->outBuf, crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES, sock->outCount, sock->outCap);
/* packet body starts after the id & nonce */
body = &sock->outBuf[peer->outStart + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
/* encrypt packet body in-place */
if (crypto_secretbox_easy(body, body, (sock->outCount - peer->outStart) - crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES,
&sock->outBuf[peer->outStart], peer->outKey) != 0) {
LAIKA_ERROR("Failed to encrypt packet!\n");
}
sock->outCount += crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES;
}
/* add to pollList's out queue */
laikaP_pushOutQueue(peer->pList, peer);
/* return packet size and prepare for next outPacket */
sz = sock->outCount - peer->outStart;
peer->outStart = -1;
return sz;
}
void laikaS_startVarPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer, LAIKAPKT_ID id) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
if (peer->outStart != -1) /* sanity check */
LAIKA_ERROR("unended OUT packet!\n");
laikaS_writeByte(sock, LAIKAPKT_VARPKT);
laikaS_zeroWrite(sock, sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE)); /* allocate space for packet size to patch later */
laikaS_startOutPacket(peer, id);
}
int laikaS_endVarPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
int patchIndx = peer->outStart - (sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE) + sizeof(LAIKAPKT_ID)); /* gets index of packet size */
LAIKAPKT_SIZE sz = (LAIKAPKT_SIZE)laikaS_endOutPacket(peer);
/* patch packet size */
memcpy((void*)&sock->outBuf[patchIndx], (void*)&sz, sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE));
return sz;
}
void laikaS_startInPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer, bool variadic) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
if (peer->inStart != -1) /* sanity check */
LAIKA_ERROR("unended IN packet!\n");
/* if we're encrypting/decrypting all packets, make sure to make the packetsize reflect this */
if (peer->useSecure && !variadic && peer->pktSize != 0)
peer->pktSize += crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES;
peer->inStart = sock->inCount;
}
int laikaS_endInPacket(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
struct sLaika_socket *sock = &peer->sock;
uint8_t *body;
size_t sz = sock->inCount - peer->inStart;
if (peer->useSecure && sz > crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES) {
body = &sock->inBuf[peer->inStart + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES];
/* decrypt packet body in-place */
if (crypto_secretbox_open_easy(body, body, (sock->inCount - peer->inStart) - crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES,
&sock->inBuf[peer->inStart], peer->inKey) != 0) {
LAIKA_ERROR("Failed to decrypt packet!\n");
}
/* decrypted message is smaller now */
sock->inCount -= crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES;
/* remove nonce */
laikaM_rmvarray(sock->inBuf, sock->inCount, peer->inStart, crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES);
sz -= crypto_secretbox_MACBYTES + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES;
}
peer->inStart = -1;
return sz;
}
void laikaS_setSecure(struct sLaika_peer *peer, bool flag) {
peer->useSecure = flag;
}
bool laikaS_handlePeerIn(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
RAWSOCKCODE err;
int recvd;
switch (peer->pktID) {
case LAIKAPKT_MAXNONE:
/* try grabbing pktID */
if (laikaS_rawRecv(&peer->sock, sizeof(uint8_t), &recvd) != RAWSOCK_OK)
return false;
/* read packet ID */
peer->pktID = laikaS_readByte(&peer->sock);
/* LAIKAPKT_VARPKT's body is unencrypted, and handled by this switch statement. LAIKAPKT_VARPKT is
also likely not to be defined in our pktSizeTable. the LAIKAPKT_VARPKT case calls laikaS_startInPacket
for itself, so skip all of this */
if (peer->pktID == LAIKAPKT_VARPKT)
goto _HandlePacketVariadic;
/* sanity check pktID, pktID's handler & make sure it's not marked as variadic */
if (peer->pktID >= LAIKAPKT_MAXNONE || peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].handler == NULL || peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].variadic)
LAIKA_ERROR("peer %p doesn't support packet id [%d]!\n", peer, peer->pktID);
peer->pktSize = peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].size;
/* if peer->useSecure is true, body is encrypted */
laikaS_startInPacket(peer, false);
goto _HandlePacketBody;
case LAIKAPKT_VARPKT:
_HandlePacketVariadic:
/* try grabbing pktID & size */
if (laikaS_rawRecv(&peer->sock, sizeof(LAIKAPKT_ID) + sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE), &recvd) != RAWSOCK_OK)
return false;
/* not worth queuing & setting pollIn for 3 bytes. if the connection is that slow, it was probably sent maliciously anyways */
if (recvd != sizeof(LAIKAPKT_ID) + sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE))
LAIKA_ERROR("couldn't read whole LAIKAPKT_VARPKT\n");
/* read packet size */
laikaS_readInt(&peer->sock, (void*)&peer->pktSize, sizeof(LAIKAPKT_SIZE));
if (peer->pktSize > LAIKA_MAX_PKTSIZE)
LAIKA_ERROR("variable packet too large!\n");
/* read pktID */
peer->pktID = laikaS_readByte(&peer->sock);
/* sanity check pktID, check valid handler & make sure it's marked as variadic */
if (peer->pktID >= LAIKAPKT_MAXNONE || peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].handler == NULL || !peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].variadic)
LAIKA_ERROR("requested packet id [%d] is not variadic!\n", peer->pktID);
/* if peer->useSecure is true, body is encrypted */
laikaS_startInPacket(peer, true);
goto _HandlePacketBody;
default:
_HandlePacketBody:
/* try grabbing the rest of the packet */
if (laikaS_rawRecv(&peer->sock, peer->pktSize - peer->sock.inCount, &recvd) != RAWSOCK_OK)
return false;
/* have we received the full packet? */
if (peer->pktSize == peer->sock.inCount) {
peer->pktSize = laikaS_endInPacket(peer);
/* dispatch to packet handler */
peer->packetTbl[peer->pktID].handler(peer, peer->pktSize, peer->uData);
/* reset */
peer->sock.inCount = 0;
peer->pktID = LAIKAPKT_MAXNONE;
}
break;
}
return laikaS_isAlive((&peer->sock));
}
bool laikaS_handlePeerOut(struct sLaika_peer *peer) {
RAWSOCKCODE err;
int sent;
if (peer->sock.outCount == 0) /* sanity check */
return true;
switch (laikaS_rawSend(&peer->sock, peer->sock.outCount, &sent)) {
case RAWSOCK_OK: /* we're ok! */
if (peer->setPollOut) { /* if POLLOUT was set, unset it */
laikaP_rmvPollOut(peer->pList, &peer->sock);
peer->setPollOut = false;
}
return true;
case RAWSOCK_POLL: /* we've been asked to set the POLLOUT flag */
if (!peer->setPollOut) { /* if POLLOUT wasn't set, set it so we'll be notified whenever the kernel has room :) */
laikaP_addPollOut(peer->pList, &peer->sock);
peer->setPollOut = true;
}
return true;
default: /* panic! */
case RAWSOCK_CLOSED:
case RAWSOCK_ERROR:
return false;
}
}